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EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE v. UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE: CUTTING DOWN ON LOGGING PROPOSALS -
A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s, the amount of acreage burned by wild-
fires has escalated, reversing a decades-long decline.1 This trend
has caused a clash between the United States Forest Service (Forest
Service) and environmental groups concerning how best to reduce
the risk of forest fires in an effort to protect our national forests and
wildlife. 2 On the one hand, Forest Service rangers advocate the
commercial sale of timber from national forests to remove debris
and thin aging stands and to reconcile costs of noncommercial
thinning.3 These thinning proposals typically focus on the removal
of large, mature trees known as old-growth trees.4 On the other
hand, environmental groups contend commercial logging does
more to destroy the environment than to restore it.5 While there is
agreement that, to a certain extent, fire is beneficial, the tension
between the two groups is partially due to a distrust of an earlier
generation Forest Service that admits it was slow to adopt environ-
1. See Paul Trachtman, Fire Fight: With Forests Burning, U.S. Officials Are Clash-
ing with Environmentalists over How Best to Reduce the Risk of Catastrophic Blazes, SMITH-
SONIAN, Aug. 2003, at 46 (estimating that seven million acres burned in 2002, up
from four million in 1987, costing federal government $1.6 billion and requiring
deployment of 30,000 firefighters to contain wildfires).
2. See generally id. (describing conflict between Forest Service and environ-
mental groups over best way to manage national forests and reduce risk of
wildfires).
3. See id. at 46-47, 51 (explaining view held by Forest Service that timber sales
are beneficial to growth and preservation of national forests). A "stand" is a de-
fined area of forest uniform in species, composition or age that can be managed as
a single unit. See Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291,
1295 (9th Cir. 2003).
4. See Ren6 Voss, Getting Burned By Logging: Logging Industry Misrepresents Envi-
ronmentalists' Role in Forest Fires, THE BALTIMORE CHRONICLE & SENTINEL, July 3,
2002, available at http://www.baltimorechronicle.com/firelies-jul02.shtml (noting
budgets of commercial loggers are dependent on sale of valuable mature trees).
Commercial thinning leaves behind twigs and other limbs, causes swift growth of
flammable shrubs and reduces forest cover which would otherwise create cool
shade, thereby creating hotter, drier conditions on the ground. See id. Large trees
are defined as those that are at least twelve inches in diameter. See Chad Hanson,
Thinning Mature Trees Ups Fire Risk, THE UNION, Aug. 25, 2001, at A6.
5. See Trachtman, supra note 1, at 52 (explaining timber sales frequently focus
on removal of beneficial timber rather than on timber that poses threat to speed
and intensity of wildfires).
(237)
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mental laws, and thus, endorsed commercial logging proposals dis-
guised as hazardous fuel treatments. 6
This tension has since carried over and strong disagreement
remains over forest management even within the Forest Service;
some personnel agree with environmentalists that smaller under-
growth, or ground fuels, as opposed to old-growth trees, should be
reduced to help prevent severe wildfires.7 This is explained by lad-
der fuels-vegetation that allows a fire to move from lower fuels
into higher fuel layers.8 Flames from fuels at the ground level, such
as pine needles, can be carried into taller fuels, i.e., shrubs, which
can ignite still taller fuels, such as tree branches. 9 Thus, it is neces-
sary to reduce ladder fuels and any accumulation of ground fuels to
decrease the intensity and severity of a wildfire. 10 Consequently,
only those logging proposals that focus on old-growth trees are the
ones environmentalists challenge because this type of logging in-
creases the frequency and gravity of wildfires which, in turn, se-
verely impacts the habitats of certain animal species.11
In January 2001, the Sierra Nevada Framework (Framework)
was published which is a comprehensive forest conservation strategy
for all eleven national forests in the Sierra Nevada mountain range,
including the Eldorado National Forest. 12 The Framework places
limitations on logging in certain areas to protect the habitat of par-
ticular animal species, namely, the California spotted owl. 13 In late
6. See Voss, supra note 4 (noting proposals for commercial logging continue,
even with overwhelming evidence that this type of logging is more of problem than
solution). Earlier generation Forest Service personnel admit to the concealment
of facts to gain support for their various logging proposals. See id.
7. See Hanson, supra note 4, at A6 (noting small undergrowth is anything less
than four inches in diameter according to Denny Truesdale, U.S. Forest Service).
Furthermore, the Forest Service's own National Fire Plan finds that "removal of
large, merchantable trees from forests does not reduce fire risk and may, in fact,
increase such risk." Id.
8. See Fuels Management, UNITED STATES FoREST SERVICE (Sept. 2001), http://
www.fs.fed.us/r5/eldorado/fire/fuels/index.html (defining forest fuels).
9. See id. (describing how various forest fuels contribute to spread of
wildfires).
10. See id. (explaining how forest fuels contribute to spread of wildfires but
noting fire is essential and allows return of nutrients to soil).
11. See id. (noting disconnect between commercial logging companies and
environmentalists); see also Hanson, supra note 4, at A6 (explaining reduction of
large, mature forest cover increases wind which then causes fires to burn more
severely and spread more quickly).
12. See Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th
Cir. 2003) (describing forest plan for Sierra Nevada mountain range).
13. See id. (describing areas known as Old Forest Emphasis Areas, Home
Range Core Areas (HRCAs) and Protected Activity Centers (PACs) where logging
is severely restricted in order to protect, inter alia, California spotted owl).
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August 2001, a large wildfire (Star Fire) broke out, consuming
thousands of acres in both the Eldorado National Forest and the
Tahoe National Forest.14 Over the next year, in response to the
Star Fire, the Forest Service implemented a restoration project in-
volving the sale of timber which formed the subject of the appeal in
Earth Island Institute v. United States Forest Service.15
In Earth Island, Earth Island Institute (Earth Island) sought a
preliminary injunction against the implementation of two timber
salvage sales recommended in the Final Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) issued by the Forest Service. 16 Earth Island argued
that the sales violated procedural requirements of both the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA). 1 7 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California denied Earth Island's request for
an injunction.' 8 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that
Earth Island demonstrated a "reasonable probability of success on
the merits" for several of their claims, and that the lower court ap-
plied an erroneous legal standard for irreparable harm.' 9
This Note is about the ongoing struggle between environmen-
tal groups and the Forest Service concerning how to best protect
our national forests. Section II discusses the numerous claims
Earth Island alleged against the Forest Service in violation of NEPA
and NFMA. 20 Next, Section III sets out general background law,
detailing the various foundational statutory and case law precedents
guiding forest preservation in the Sierra Nevada range. 2' Section
IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's determination that injunctions will
14. See id. at 1295 (noting fire swept through two national forests and some
private lands).
15. See id. (detailing history of forest management plan).
16. See id. (challenging logging proposals).
17. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1296 (challenging logging proposals); see gener-
ally National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter NEPA]; see generally Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
of 1974, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2000) [hereinafter NFMA].
18. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1297 (holding Plaintiffs were unlikely to suc-
ceed on their challenges to Forest Service methodology and data because agencies
are entitled to rely upon their own methodology and experts).
19. See id. (finding district court's conclusion that Earth Island failed to show
"concrete probability of irreparable harm" is improper legal standard and, thus, an
abuse of discretion).
20. See id. For a discussion of the claims brought against the Forest Service,
see infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the background precedent guiding forest preservation,
see infra notes 46-89 and accompanying text.
2006]
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be favored when injury to the environment is likely.22 Section V
evaluates the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and decision to overturn
the lower court.2 3 Finally, Section VI of this Note considers the im-
pact Earth Island and recent legislation will have on logging in na-
tional forests ravaged by wildfires and the need for strict
implementation of preservation guidelines so that millions of




By the time it was extinguished in September 2001, the Star
Fire had consumed thousands of acres in the Eldorado National
Forest of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. 25 Immediately after the
fire, the Forest Service prepared a Burned Area Emergency Reha-
bilitation (BAER) report in conjunction with an EIS, assessing the
damage to the forest. 26 After public comment, the Forest Service
released the Final EIS. 27 Its objective was to avoid another "stand
replacing" fire by removing dead trees and preventing the develop-
ment of "excessive woody debris."28 The Final EIS also aimed to
prevent soil erosion by promoting ground cover and saving down
logs for the use of dependent animal species, while at the same
time, capitalizing on the pecuniary value of dead trees through log-
ging.29 The Final EIS recommended the removal of all but four to
eight large dead trees per acre in general forest areas with greater
22. For a discussion of the court's holding, see infra notes 99-137 and accom-
panying text.
23. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see infra notes 138-69 and accom-
panying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the court's decision, see infra notes 170-
82 and accompanying text.
25. See Earth Island-Inst. v: United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1295 (9th
Cir. 2003) (describing Star Fire).
26. See id. (explaining BAER report and EIS results differed in terms of as-
sessed burn damage). The BAER report estimated 11% of the forest had exper-
ienced high fire intensity, 57% experienced moderate intensity and 32% low
intensity. See id. In contrast, the EIS estimated 35% of the forest experienced high
intensity burns, 45% moderate intensity, and 18% low intensity, leaving only 2% of
the forest untouched. See id. Plaintiffs dispute the findings in the second report.
See id. at n.1.
27. See id. at 1295 (noting Draft EIS published in March 2002 proposed log-
ging 1714 acres of forest using helicopter, tractor and skyline methods). The Final
EIS released in June 2002 proposed this same action. See id.
28. See id. (describing objective of Final EIS). For further discussion about
stands, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
29. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1295 (noting 71% of Star Fire area had en-
countered "high severity burn," according to Forest Service entomologist Sherri
Smith). Smith also determined that trees with 35% green canopy or less were
4
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than fifty percent tree mortality and in Old Forest Emphasis Areas
with more than seventy-five percent tree mortality, without any limi-
tation on tree diameter.30
Additionally, over the course of the year, the Forest Service im-
plemented a conservation strategy designed to rehabilitate and re-
store the burned area and assess the environmental impact, as
prescribed under the Framework. 31 The Framework mandates the
establishment of 300-acre Protected Activity Centers (PACs) around
known or suspected California spotted owl nesting sites and se-
verely restricts logging in these areas.3 2 The Framework also calls
for 1000-acre Home Range Core Areas (HRCAs) around each PAC
to further protect the zones presumed to have the most concen-
trated spotted owl activity. 33 The PACs are required to be "main-
tained regardless of California spotted owl occupancy status, unless
[their] habitat is rendered unsuitable by a catastrophic stand-re-
placing event and surveys conducted to protocol confirm non-occu-
pancy."34 Furthermore, should a fire destroy a PAC, the Framework
compels the Forest Service to attempt to relocate the PAC to an-
other area within the HRCA. 35
Here, the Forest Service surveyed PAC055 and PAC075, two El-
dorado Forest PACs within the Star Fire area, and concluded that
only 4% of PAC055 and 13% of PAC075 were at less than 75% tree
mortality per acre. 36 Additionally, only 5% of PAC055 HRCA and
18% of PAC075 HRCA remained at less than 75% mortality, ena-
dead, based on scientific literature, Forest Service data and cambium sampling. See
id. Cambium is a formative tree layer that produces new cells. See id. at 1296 n.2.
30. See id. at 1296 (describing this as preferred alternative of Final EIS). Old
Forest Emphasis Areas are managed with the same logging restrictions as HRCAs,
both of which are designed to protect, inter alia, the California spotted owl. See id.
31. See id. at 1295-96 (describing that Sierra Nevada Framework, published in
2001, established conservation strategy for all eleven national forests in Sierra Ne-
vada Mountain Range). The Framework includes limitations on logging in specific
zones of the forest. See id.
32. See id. (explaining California spotted owl is not currently endangered spe-
cies). When the Final EIS was published, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service classi-
fied the species as "sensitive," but determined that the species did not compel
additional protection under the Endangered Species Act. See id.
33. See id. at 1296 (adding further that within both these areas and PACs,
trees with diameters greater than twelve inches may not be removed, though trees
of slightly larger girth may be thinned in certain circumstances to "address immi-
nent hazards to human safety").
34. See id. (detailing stringent requirements of Sierra Nevada Framework re-
garding PACs).
35. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1296 (noting exception to Framework require-
ment that PACs must be maintained).
36. See id. at 1296-97 (relying on Smith's mortality guidelines estimates).
2006]
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bling the Forest Service to conclude in its Final EIS that relocation
of the PAC within the HRCA was not possible.37
Accordingly, in August 2002, nearly one year after the wildfire,
the Forest Service Supervisor adopted an amended Final EIS which
concluded that both PACs should be dropped. 38 Earth Island filed
an administrative appeal against this decision, but the Forest Ser-
vice affirmed its decision the following month.39 Consequently, the
Forest Service divided the area in the Eldorado National Forest into
two timber salvage sales.40 Earth Island challenged this decision in
federal district court and requested a preliminary injunction. 41
Earth Island argued that the Forest Service had violated procedural
requirements imposed by NEPA and NFMA.42 The district court
awarded a temporary injunction on October 3, but on October 11
the court denied Earth Island's request for a preliminary injunc-
tion, finding that Earth Island was "unlikely to succeed on chal-
lenges to the Forest Service methodology and data because
agencies are entitled to rely upon their own methodology and ex-
perts."43 Furthermore, the court determined that Earth Island
failed to establish that the timber sales would result in "irreparable
harm" to the California spotted owl or that the "balance of hard-
ships" tipped in Earth Island's favor.44 Earth Island appealed this
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
37. See id. (relying on same data); see also id. at 1304-05 (explaining Plaintiff's
argument that, because location of PAC075 is along border of both Eldorado Na-
tional Forest and Tahoe National Forest, and Tahoe National Forest has a PAC on
its side with the same number, the entire PAC075 should be considered as a single
area subject to single EIS, contrary to Forest Service's argument contending that
the two regions were numbered identically but managed separately, thus permit-
ting separate EIS for each).
38. See id. at 1297 (describing plan that Forest Service Supervisor John Berry
approved was modified so no trees with green canopy would be removed from
partially burned stands within former PACs and that cambium sampling should
not be used because of its relative inefficiency).
39. See id. (explaining final administrative appeal broadened restriction on
removal of trees with green canopy to those within Old Forest Emphasis Areas).
40. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1297 (adding that Forest Service awarded the
contracts to Sierra Pacific Industries).
41. See id. (challenging logging proposals).
42. See id. (explaining because logging was to begin immediately, Plaintiffs
also requested temporary restraining order on October 1 against logging trees with
any green canopy remaining). The court permitted Sierra Pacific Industries to
intervene on behalf of the Forest Service. See id.
43. See id. (holding Forest Service took "hard look" at environmental impact
raised by restoration project and there was no abuse of discretion in preparing
separate EIS for each national forest).
44. See id. (indicating no preliminary injunction would issue).
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cuit, which reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings. 45
III. BACKGROUND
A. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Certain established criteria must be met for a grant of prelimi-
nary injunction. 46 The Ninth Circuit identified two sets of criteria
for preliminary injunctive relief in Johnson v. California State Board of
Accountancy.47 The traditional criteria requires that a plaintiff show:
"(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility
of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted,
(3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advance-
ment of the public interest (in certain cases) .'48 Alternatively, a
court may grant injunctive relief if it finds that the moving party
"demonstrates either a combination of probable success on the mer-
its and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions
are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the moving
party's] favor."49
1. Irreparable Injury
The Supreme Court declared that "[e] nvironmental injury, by
its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages
and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irrepara-
ble" when it decided Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell.50 In
Amoco, two Alaskan Native villages sought injunctions to prohibit
exploratory oil drilling, claiming that the Secretary of the Interior
had not complied with the Alaska National Interest Lands Conser-
45. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1297 (overturning district court's denial of
injunctive relief).
46. See id. at 1297-1300 (challenging district court's interpretation of prelimi-
nary injunctive relief).
47. 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (defining traditional and alternative
sets of criteria, either of which must be met before grant of preliminary injunctive
relief).
48. See id. (citing Dollar Rent A Car v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1374
(9th Cir. 1985)) (detailing "traditional" set of criteria).
49. See id. (emphasis in original) (citing Martin v. Int'l Olympic Comm., 740
F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984)) (describing second set of criteria, explaining that as
hardship becomes greater and degree of irreparable injury increases, probability
of success on merits decreases but minimum is at least needed for "fair" chance of
success on merits).
50. 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (rejecting presumption of irreparable injury
when agency fails to thoroughly evaluate environmental impact of proposed ac-
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vation Act. 51 The Supreme Court held that injury was not at all
probable and therefore denied injunctive relief.52 The Court elab-
orated that if injury is sufficiently likely, the balance of harms will
usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environ-
ment.53 Consequently, several courts have since held that commer-
cial logging plans alone may fulfill the irreparable harm
requirement because of the likelihood of injury and the long-term
environmental effects. 54 Furthermore, under Rule 65 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), a "presently existing actual
threat" of irreparable injury is adequate for preliminary injunctive
relief.55
2. Success on the Merits
As to irreparable injury, the moving party has to show only
probable success on the merits for a grant of preliminary injunctive
relief.56 Probable success and possibility of irreparable injury are
51. See id. at 531. Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act provides
that:
before allowing the use, occupancy or disposition of public lands that
would significantly restrict Alaskan Natives' use of those lands for subsis-
tence, the head of the federal agency having primary jurisdiction over the
lands must give notice, conduct a hearing, and determine that the restric-
tion of subsistence uses is necessary and that reasonable steps will be
taken to minimize adverse impacts.
Id. (quoting Alaska National Interest Conservation Act, § 810(a)).
52. See id. at 545-46 (holding exploratory oil drilling will not cause type of
harm that statute at issue was designed to prevent and development of energy
resources may be more important).
53. See id. (explaining more deference is extended to environment for its pro-
tection and irreparable injury requirement thus turns on probability of that harm
actually transpiring); see also Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d
562, 569 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that despite financial burden of injunction to
Forest Service, burden is outweighed by fact that old-growth forests, "if cut, take
hundreds of years to reproduce") (citing Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United
States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1382 (9th Cir. 1998)).
54. See, e.g., Idaho, 222 F.3d at 569 (holding "evidence of environmental harm
is sufficient to tip the balance in favor of injunctive relief"); Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545
(holding "[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately reme-
died by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e.,
irreparable"); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding "[t]he balance of harms favors the issuance of an injunction to
prevent further irreparable harm to the environment"); Cuddy Mountain, 137 F.3d
at 1382 (holding "[t] he old growth forests plaintiffs seek to protect would, if cut,
take hundreds of years to reproduce").
55. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE CIV.2D § 2948.1 (2005) (adding injury need not be certain to oc-
cur for preliminary injunctive relief).
56. See Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding anything other than "probability" of success on merits is im-
proper legal standard).
8
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essentially two points on a sliding scale in which the degree of in-
jury increases as the probability of success decreases. 57 A denial of a
preliminary injunction is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion
and a reviewing court will find an abuse of discretion only when the
court applies an improper legal standard or bases its holding on
clearly erroneous findings of fact.58
B. Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs judicial re-
view of agency decisions under both NEPA and NFMA and requires
that in order for plaintiffs to prevail under APA, they must demon-
strate that the Forest Service decision was "arbitrary" and "capri-
cious. '59 Under APA, an agency decision is deemed arbitrary and
capricious if the agency:
-.. has relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important as-
pect of the problem, offered an explanation for its deci-
sion that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a dif-
ference in view or the product of agency expertise. 60
1. The National Environmental Policy Act
In 1969, Congress passed NEPA to establish a national policy
for the environment. 61 Congress endorsed NEPA in response to
increasing awareness over the critical importance in preserving the
environment and in recognition of humankind's profound impact
57. See id. (citing Arcamuzi v. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir.
1987)) (emphasizing that if plaintiff shows no success on merits, preliminary in-
junction should not issue).
58. See id. (citing Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001)) (dis-
cussing high threshold for review of grant of preliminary injunctive relief and ex-
plaining district court applied improper legal standard when assessing possibility
of irreparable harm).
59. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000) [hereinafter
APA] (detailing scope of judicial review for federal agencies).
60. See O'Keeffe's, Inc. v. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 92 F.3d
940, 942 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (explaining circumstances where agency decision is
arbitrary or capricious).
61. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000)
(noting NEPA's intent). The stated purpose of the original 1969 Act was "[t]o
declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or elimi-
nate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and wel-
fare of man . . . ." Id.
2006]
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on the environment. 62 NEPA has two main purposes: (1) it re-
quires federal agencies to consider all significant aspects of the
environmental impact of a proposed action; and (2) it ensures
agencies inform the public that they have considered any environ-
mental consequences in making their decision. 63 Consequently,
federal agencies must prepare an EIS prior to taking any "major
federal action" which may significantly affect the environment. 64
An agency is required only to take a "hard look" at the environmen-
tal effects in making this assessment.65
If an agency determines that its action will have a significant
impact on the environment, the EIS requirement is triggered and
the agency must next define the scope of the EIS.66 In certain cir-
cumstances the agency must consider several actions in a single
EIS. 67 Actions that are considered "connected," "cumulative" or
"similar" are to be considered in a single EIS in accordance with
section 1508.25 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Regulations) 68
This section guards against an agency dividing an action into sev-
62. See id. (declaring it is national policy of Federal Government, in coopera-
tion with State and local governments and other related agencies and bodies, to do
whatever possible to protect environment).
63. See Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2002) (adding NEPA does not contain substantive environmental standards
but requires agencies to take "hard look" at environmental consequences).
64. See id. at 1067 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C)) (adding certain actions cat-
egorically require EIS; for those that do not, assessment must be made to deter-
mine whether proposed project will significantly impact environment). Because
NEPA does not explicitly define a "major federal action," there has been disagree-
ment as to the triggering of the EIS requirement; both the Ninth Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court, however, have held that the EIS requirement is not
prompted if a proposed project does not adversely affect the physical environ-
ment. See Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
NEPA does not require EIS for actions that preserve environment); see also Thomas
v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting "NEPA requires an EIS for
'major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment"'). See generally Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460
U.S. 766, 772-73 (1983) (discussing NEPA requirements are triggered when there
is close relationship between environmental change and effect at issue).
65. See Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding judgment of agency as to environmental consequences under
NEPA claim should be upheld unless unreasonable); see also Kern, 284 F.3d at 1066
(stressing NEPA confers only procedural rights; it simply prescribes the necessary
process, not substantive environmental standards).
66. For further discussion of NEPA, see supra note 61; see also Northwest Res.
Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 1995)
(detailing NEPA requirements); see also Thomas, 753 F.2d at 758 (detailing scope of
EIS).
67. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.25 (2005) (explaining actions that should be consid-
ered in single EIS); see also Thomas, 753 F.2d at 758 (detailing scope of EIS).
68. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.25 (explaining requirement of single EIS when ac-
tions are "connected," "cumulative" or "similar"). Section 1508.25 states:
10
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eral smaller actions, each of which would have minimal environ-
mental impacts when considered independently, but, when
considered together, have a significant effect on the environment. 69
In Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck,70 the Ninth Circuit held
that the Forest Service did not consider the cumulative impacts of
certain aspects of a timber sale and thus violated NEPA.7 1 In Native
Ecosystems, the Gallatin National Forest Plan fixed a maximum road
density standard for the entire forest.72 The Forest Service recog-
nized that the standard would be violated for each of the twelve
congressionally-authorized timber sales, and thus recommended a
To determine the scope of environmental impact statements, agencies
shall consider 3 types of actions .... They include:
(a) Actions (other than unconnected single actions) which may be:
(1) Connected actions, which means that they are closely related
and therefore should be discussed in the same impact statement.
Actions are connected if they:
(i) Automatically trigger other actions which may require envi-
ronmental impact statements.
(ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken
previously or simultaneously.
(iii) Are interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on
the larger action for their justification.
(2) Cumulative actions, which when viewed with other proposed ac-
tions have cumulatively significant impacts and should therefore
be discussed in the same impact statement.
(3) Similar actions, which when viewed with other reasonably fore-
seeable or proposed agency actions, have similarities that pro-
vide a basis for evaluating their environmental consequences
together, such as common timing or geography. An agency may
wish to analyze these actions in the same impact statement. It
should do so when the best way to assess adequately the com-
bined impacts of similar actions or reasonable alternatives to
such actions is to treat them in a single impact statement.
Id.
See also Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1304-05 (9th
Cir. 2003) (stating single EIS is required for separate projects when projects are
"connected," "cumulative" or "similar actions" under NEPA); Northwest, 56 F.3d at
1067-68 (detailing impacts to be considered in single EIS).
69. See Thomas, 753 F.2d at 758 (noting theory behind single EIS require-
ment); see also Northwest, 56 F.3d at 1068 (explaining rationale behind comprehen-
sive EIS).
70. 304 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. See id. (arguing Forest Service failed to consider cumulative impact of mul-
tiple decisions about same element of timber sale). The court also discussed "con-
nected actions," setting out the "independent utility" test applied by the Ninth
Circuit. See id. at 894. The test states that "[w] here each of two projects would
have taken place with or without the other, each has 'independent utility' and the
two are not considered connected actions." Id.
72. See id. at 890 (detailing Gallatin National Forest Plan). Road density stan-
dard is quantified by a Habitat Effectiveness Index (HEI), which indicates how
open roads and motorized trails might affect the habitat of elk. See id. The higher
the HEI is for a certain area, the fewer roads permitted. See id.
2472006]
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road density standard amendment for each timber sale proposal. 73
These amendments were considered independently, rather than in
one comprehensive EIS.74 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on sections 1508.7 and 1508.25 of the Regulations,
which together require that when determining the scope of an EIS,
the cumulative impact of the amendment at issue must be consid-
ered with reasonably foreseeable future amendments. 75 Conse-
quently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Forest Service's
failure to consider all "reasonably foreseeable" road density amend-
ments together with the amendment of the timber sale in a single
EIS, violated NEPA.7 6
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit determined that the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) did not violate NEPA's requirement
that "connected," "cumulative" or "similar actions" be considered in
a single EIS in Northwest Resource Information Center, Inc. v. National
Marine Fisheries Service.77 In Northwest, the Corps, who manage the
Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS), an operation of
dams and reservoirs that generate low-cost electricity, implemented
measures to assist sockeye salmon in their downstream migrations
in response to their classification as an endangered species, and to
improve the FCRPS which was found to be a major factor in the
decline of the salmon population.78 A transportation program was
employed which benefited the migration of the salmon, and flow
improvement measures were taken which preserved the hydro-
power interests that profited from the inexpensive electricity.7 9
The Ninth Circuit found that an ongoing salmon transportation
73. See id. at 891 (realizing amendment will effectively alleviate Forest Service
of its duty under forest plan).
74. See id. at 890 (noting Forest Service's argument that because amendments
were spread throughout forest, Forest Service need not consider other road den-
sity amendments within timber sale proposal at issue).
75. See Native Ecosystems, 304 F.3d at 895 (defining "cumulative impact," ac-
cording to 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.7, as "the impact on the environment which results
from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present or
reasonably foreseeable future actions") (emphasis in original). Section 1508.25(c) (3)
mandates that "cumulative impact" be considered when determining the scope of
an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.25.
76. See Native Ecosystems, 304 F.3d at 896 (explaining reasonably foreseeable
requirement coupled with cumulative impact).
77. 56 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining actions were not "inextri-
cably intertwined" and, thus, not "connected actions").
78. See id. at 1063 (admitting that several characteristics of dams, such as
blocked habitats, delays in migration and increased predation cause salmon
deaths).
79. See id. at 1063-64 (describing advantages and disadvantages of methods
implemented to assist salmon in their migration).
12
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program and river flow improvement measures were independent
- each could exist without the other - and that this case dealt not
with "links in the same bit of chain" but "separate segment[s] of
chain."' 0 As such, they were not "connected actions" under NEPA
and so were not required to be considered in the same EIS.81
2. National Forest Management Act
In 1976, Congress adopted NFMA, expanding and amending
the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of
1974, which called for the management of national forests.8 2
NFMA is the principal statute overseeing the administration of na-
tional forests.83 Its chief concern is the management of timber
harvests.8 4
NFMA provides a two-step process for forest management.8 5
First, NFMA requires the Forest Service to develop a Land Re-
sources Management Plan (or Forest Plan) for each national for-
est.8 6 Second, it demands that implementation of each plan be
"site-specific," meaning that any activities in the forest, including
commercial logging, must be consistent with the established Forest
Plan.8 7 In this way, NFMA is different from NEPA because it im-
poses substantive constraints on the management of the forest.88
Congress' policy is that all forested lands in the National Forest Sys-
80. See id. at 1068 (citing Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d
394, 400 (9th Cir. 1989)) (distinguishing cases with actions considered not "con-
nected"). Moreover, the two actions together would serve to benefit the environ-
ment, whereas precedent case law addressed only "connected actions" that had
adverse impacts on the environment. See id. at 1068-69.
81. See id. at 1069 (declaring court's holding). The court stated, "we cannot
agree ... that the transportation program and the flow improvement measures are
so interdependent as parts of the larger action of improving the survival of the
salmon that they must be addressed in the same NEPA document." Id.
82. See National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2000) (requiring
Secretary of Agriculture to evaluate forest lands, develop management program
based on multiple-use, sustained-yield principles, and implement resource man-
agement plan for National Forest System).
83. See NOAA Coastal Services Center: The National Forest Management Act,
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/cmfp/reference/National_ForestManagementAct.
htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
84. See NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (requiring Forest Service to integrate re-
sources into national forest land use plans and recognizing equal importance of
trees and timber product materials).
85. See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372,
1376 (9th Cir. 1998) (detailing NFMA requirements).
86. See id. (explaining first aim of NFMA).
87. See id. (detailing second aim of NFMA).
88. See id. (providing explanation that NEPA's EIS requirement is procedural
while NFMA imposes substantive requirements). For a discussion of procedural
rights conferred by NEPA, see supra notes 61-63, 65 and accompanying text.
2006]
13
Veerruso: Earth Island Institute v. United States Forest Service: Cutting d
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
250 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVII: p. 237
tem are to be maintained so as to maximize long term public bene-
fits in an environmentally sound manner. 89
C. Healthy Forest Restoration Act
On December 3, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into
law the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA).9° HFRA was de-
signed to reduce the threat of wildfires which have blazed out of
control in recent years as a result of poor forest management.91
Principally, HFRA encourages thinning of the national forests and
aims to streamline appeals, public involvement and environmental
review in order to ensure a more effective and timely process.92
Environmental groups argue, however, that HFRA is essentially
a way to dramatically increase commercial logging.93 Indeed, they
assert that timber companies are strong proponents of HFRA. 94 In
fact, Mark E. Rey, President Bush's Undersecretary of Agriculture
overseeing the Forest Service, is a former timber lobbyist.95 Fur-
thermore, much of the purported changes that went into HFRA
89. See 36 C.F.R. pt. 219.1 (2005) (detailing congressional policy notes).
90. See Healthy Forest Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 108-148 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter HFRA]; see also President Bush Signs Healthy Forests Restoration Act into Law, THE
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/healthyforests/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2004) [hereinafter THE WHITE HOUSE] (asserting that legislation is based
on sound science and advances President's Healthy Forests Initiative pledge to pro-
tect America's forests). HFRA is the first major forest management legislation in
twenty-five years. See Associated Press, Bush Signs Forest Bill (Dec. 4, 2003), http://
www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/12/03/forests.initiative.ap/.
91. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 90 (noting 147,049 fires burned almost
eleven million acres from 2002 to 2004).
92. See id. (detailing HFRA's objectives).
93. See Sean Loughlin, Experts Disagree on Forest Management: The Devil Is in the
Details, Aug. 22, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/22/
fire.science/index.html (discussing Healthy Forest Initiative and indicating that
environmentalists find administration's plan will subject excessive federal land to
amplified road building and logging); see also Douglas Bevington, Bush Administra-
tion Poised to Assault Our National Forests, THE LomA PRIETAN, Feb.-Mar. 2003 (sup-
porting environmentalists' stance that HFRA is "worst assault on our forests"); see
also The Bush Administration Environmental Record, CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE
RESEARCH, http://www. cooperativeresearch. org/context.jsp? item= thebushad-
ministration s environmentalrecord_1058 (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESEARCH] (explaining conflicts of interest).
94. See Bevington, supra note 93 (explaining timber companies applied signifi-
cant pressure to get HFRA passed); see also CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESEARCH,
supra note 93 (noting HFRA nearly doubles federal budget for forest-thinning
projects); see also Loughlin, supra note 93 (adding that Ann Camp, a former re-
search scientist with the Forest Service, and currently professor of forestry at the
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies in New Haven, Connecticut, also
warned that if logging operation is sloppy, branches left behind could contribute
to already high level of brush, increasing risk of fire).
95. See Bevington, supra note 93 (implying possibility of HFRA's pro-logging
slant).
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mirror items on a "wish list" offered by Rey's former employer, the
American Forest and Paper Association. 96
Conversely, proponents of HFRA argue that environmental
groups lack the credibility they once enjoyed several years ago.9 7
They theorize that this erosion of public support may be the result
of persistent lawsuits and dire warnings of environmental crises,
strategies habitually employed by these groups.9 8
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
1. Irreparable Injury
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether the denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction impeding execution of the Star Fire timber sales
was appropriate in Earth Island Institute v. United States Forest Service.99
Relying on the criteria set out in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held
that the lower court applied an improper legal standard in its de-
nial of the preliminary injunction by placing a higher burden of
proof on Earth Island than was necessary. 10 0 Johnson established
that to obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must only demon-
strate "probable success on the merits and the possibility of irrepa-
96. See id. (elaborating that at least eight draft regulations match items on
wish list presented in testimony by American Forest and Paper Association).
97. See Michael Milstein, Activists'New Cause: Restoring Their Clout, THE OREGO-
NIAN, Feb. 3, 2005, at Al (pointing out that environmental groups once dominated
national agenda at election times but that focus of national debates has since
shifted to more important issues such as Iraq and economy).
98. See id. (noting theory that environmental groups have "cried wolf" one too
many times, a tactic to which general public has grown wise).
99. 351 F.3d 1291, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (defining criteria Ninth Circuit
established in granting preliminary injunctive relief). In his concurrence, Circuit
judge Noonan expressed his belief that because of its financial interest in the tim-
ber sale, the Forest Service should be disqualified from approving the sale of tim-
ber. See id. at 1309 (Noonan, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 1298 (noting court's holding). The district court found that
Earth Island "failed to establish that the project will result in actual harm to the
California spotted owl as opposed to speculation that some such harm could possi-
bly occur" and that Plaintiff "failed to identify any concrete probability of irreparable
harm in any other respect" (emphasis added). Id. A preliminary injunction re-
quires only that a plaintiff show probable success on the merits and a finding of
possible injury. See id. The Supreme Court, however, has held that "[e]nvironmen-
tal injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages
and is often permanent or... irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, there-
fore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to pro-
tect the environment." Id. at 1299 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 545 (1987)) (holding "court's conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to show
'actual harm' or a 'concrete probability of irreparable harm' constitutes the appli-
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rable injury." 10 1 Yet the district court held that Earth Island needed
to show "actual harm" and "concrete probability" of injury. 10 2
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court abused its
discretion by basing its decision on an erroneous legal standard. 03
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit determined that despite this abuse
of discretion, remand would not be necessary if Earth Island failed
to exhibit a possibility for success on the merits. 10 4 To make this
assessment, the Ninth Circuit turned to the claims advanced by
Earth Island alleging the Forest Service's violation of both NEPA
and NFMA.105
2. Earth Island's Probability of Success on the Merits
a. Limited Success with NEPA Claims
Earth Island challenged the EIS advanced by the Forest Service
under NEPA on three points: (1) the Forest Service utilized ques-
tionable data in creating the Final EIS; (2) the Forest Service
should have created one comprehensive EIS for both the Eldorado
National Forest and Tahoe National Forest; and (3) the Forest Ser-
vice should have considered the cumulative impact that Tahoe Na-
tional Forest's actions would have on certain animal species. 10 6
i. Questionable Data
Earth Island argued that the Forest Service used "questionable
mortality standards" to overestimate the extent of tree destruction,
thereby enabling the Forest Service to drop PACs and authorize
more extensive logging of larger trees than was permissible under
the Framework. 0 7 Furthermore, in making these determinations,
101. See Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.
1995) (defining proper preliminary injunctive standard).
102. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1298 (indicating district court imposed
higher burden on Earth Island for preliminary injunctive relief).
103. See id. at 1299 (noting district court employed improper legal standard in
assessing irreparable injury).
104. See id. at 1299-1300 (explaining district court's determination that Earth
Island failed to show any likelihood of success on its claims must next be analyzed).
105. See id. at 1300 (clarifying that if Earth Island showed strong likelihood of
success on merits, it would need only make minimal showing of injury to justify
preliminary injunction).
106. See id. at 1300-06 (setting out three claims Earth Island advanced).
107. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1300 (noting Plaintiffs argument that data
relied on by Forest Service classifies large percentage of trees as dead, contra-
dicting vast scientific literature which suggests same trees would survive). Earth
Island offered its own expert evidence of many healthy trees on the ground one
year after the fire, contrasting the calculations made by the Forest Service that
trees with a 65% scorch rate would not survive. See id.
16
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the Forest Service discounted other relevant data in order to rely
more heavily on its own data.10 8 The Ninth Circuit found that the
Final EIS discussed the Forest Service's decision, provided all rele-
vant data and reasonable explanations for the exclusion of other
data, and directly addressed opposing viewpoints. 109 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Forest Service did not act arbi-
trarily and capriciously under NEPA in its determination that log-
ging large trees would reduce potential damage caused by future
fire.11 0
Earth Island also contended however, that the data relied on
by the Forest Service was factually incorrect.' In advocating this
argument, Earth Island provided expert evidence supporting the
existence of much higher numbers of green foliage in contrast to
the Final EIS, which found that none existed." 2 The Ninth Circuit
held that because a claim of factual inaccuracy is different from an
attack on the methodology itself, and because the record was insuf-
ficient to uphold a finding of factual inaccuracy, the matter must be
addressed on remand.' 13
108. See id. at 1301 (explaining that although agency needs to show proof of
its evidence under NEPA to avoid court suspicions of its methodology, agency has
wide discretion when evaluating its scientific evidence so long as it takes "hard
look" at issues and reacts to opposing views as NEPA requires); see also 40 C.F.R. pt.
1502.9(a)-(b)(2005). Additionally, when contrasting views are advanced, an
agency may rely on the opinions of its own experts even if a court finds contrary
evidence more persuasive. See id. at 1301 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Coun-
cil, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)) (noting because scientific data requires technical
expertise, courts must defer to informed opinion of responsible agency).
109. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1301 (finding Forest Service provided data
from opposing viewpoints in Final EIS, directly addressed questions about removal
process and requested other data but never received it, noting that author of that
data informed Forest Service that study was not about post-fire salvage measures).
110. See id. For a discussion of the requirements under NEPA, see supra notes
61-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the APA standard, see supra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
111. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1301-02 (explaining regardless of methodol-
ogy used to interpret data, that data itself did not correspond to reality, which, if
true, does more than challenge agency's methodology or conclusion but suggests
that agency relied on "factually inaccurate data" or did not utilize methodology
they claimed to follow).
112. See id. at 1302 (finding Forest Service's expert arrived at "radically differ-
ent" results from those reported in Final EIS and that timber sale area maps reclas-
sify "severely burned" areas as "cut tree" areas). "Cut tree" areas are only marked
when the trees have experienced mild or moderate burns and the logging com-
pany may only cut marked trees. See id. Thus, Plaintiffs suggest that the Forest
Service "implicitly acknowledged a lower burn level." Id.
113. See id. (noting holding). The court explained, "[a]t this stage, the re-
cord does not allow us to conclude that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in relying on its own data and discounting the alternate evidence of-
fered by Plaintiffs." Id. The court further noted that if Earth Island can convince
2006] 253
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ii. Comprehensive EIS: Connected, Cumulative or
Similar Actions?
Earth Island claimed that NEPA obligated the Forest Service to
prepare a single EIS concerning the Star Fire project and timber
sales in both the Eldorado National Forest and neighboring Tahoe
National Forest. 114 To prevail, Earth Island had to demonstrate
that the projects were, in fact, "connected," "cumulative" or "simi-
lar" and that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
failing to consider these actions in a single report.115
To determine whether the projects were "connected" for pur-
poses of NEPA review, the Ninth Circuit relied on its "independent
utility" test."16 The test states that "where each of two projects
would have taken place with or without the other, each has 'inde-
pendent utility' and the two are not considered connected ac-
tions."1 17  Here, because each project alone would fulfill its
respective forests' conservation goals, the Ninth Circuit determined
that the projects did have independent utility, and as such, were not
"connected actions."''1 8
The Ninth Circuit then evaluated whether the actions could be
regarded as "cumulative actions." 1' 9 Here, the Ninth Circuit found
that many of the factors used to determine whether actions are "cu-
the district court of arbitrary and capricious behavior, it may be able to succeed on
the merits of this claim. See id.
114. See id. at 1304 (discussing established law that single EIS is required for
separate projects when there is one proposal governing projects or when projects
are "connected," "cumulative" or "similar actions" under NEPA) (citing Native Eco-
systems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2002)).
115. See id. at 1305 (explaining that although agencies have wide discretion
under NEPA, some actions must be reviewed together to preclude projects from
being split up, which independently have minor environmental implications, but
when considered aggregately, have substantial environmental impact). For a dis-
cussion of the APA standard, see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
116. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1305 (explaining test as when each project
transpires without regard to other, projects have independent utility and are not
regarded as "connected actions"). For further discussion of the independent util-
ity test, see supra note 71.
117. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1305 (citing Native Ecosystems, 304 F.3d at
894) (describing "independent utility" test).
118. See id. (determining each project would generate revenue and fulfill its
own forest conservation goal on its own, whether or not other project would pro-
ceed). For a discussion of "connected actions," see supra notes 68-81 and accompa-
nying text.
119. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1305 (explaining single EIS is required for
multiple timber sales when sales "formed part of a single timber salvage project,
were announced simultaneously, were reasonably foreseeable, and were located in
the same watershed") (citing Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161
F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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mulative" did not apply. 120 Thus, the court held the actions were
not "cumulative."' 21
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the actions may
constitute "similar actions."'122 The Ninth Circuit agreed that there
were many parallels between the two actions, thus concluding that
the timber sales were, in fact, "similar actions."' 23 Despite this find-
ing that the actions were "similar," however, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the Forest Service had not acted arbitrarily in deciding
that two separate impact statements constituted "the best way to as-
sess adequately the combined impacts of similar actions."'124
iii. Cumulative Impact on Animal Species
Earth Island maintained that even if a single EIS was not re-
quired for the timber sales of both forests, the Forest Service never-
theless failed to consider any foreseeable cumulative environmental
impact on the California spotted owl caused by actions taken in
Tahoe National Forest. 125 Specifically, Earth Island argued the Fi-
nal EIS failed to consider any cumulative impact from Tahoe's
120. See id. (explaining boundary between sale areas was determined prior to
Forest Service decision, sales and analyses were on distinctive time schedules and
record did not intimate that Forest Service intended to segment projects to mini-
mize environmental impacts). To the contrary, the Final EIS explicitly addressed
impacts of comparable conservation plan in Tahoe National Forest. See id.
121. See id. (distinguishing that although regulations may support conclusion
that projects are "cumulative actions," Forest Service did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in its decision not to prepare single EIS). For a discussion of "cumula-
tive actions," see supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
122. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1305-06 (establishing "similar actions" as "ac-
tions which, when viewed with other reasonably foreseeable or proposed agency
actions, have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating their environmental
consequences together, such as common timing or geography") (quoting 40
C.F.R. pt. 1508.25(a)(3) (2004)). For further discussion of "similar actions," see
supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
123. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1305-06 (explaining similarities in underlying
cause, proposed solution and general geography contribute to determination that
actions are "similar"); supra note 68.
124. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1305-06 (holding Plaintiff's insistence that
"similar" actions must be considered together in one EIS is inaccurate). Relying
on statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the language allows more
deference in that an agency may wish to address projects under one EIS but is not
bound to do so, and, in this instance, the Forest Service may have determined that
two separate EIS reports were more effective than a single EIS report. See id.; see
also 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.25(a) (3).
125. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1306 (clarifying that cumulative impact in-
volves "incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency ...or person
undertakes such other actions") (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.7).
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PAC075.1 26 Because of the close proximity of Tahoe's protected
owl territory PAC075 to the Eldorado Forest line, the Ninth Circuit
concluded it was "reasonably foreseeable" that Eldorado's PAC
would play a vital role in supporting Tahoe's PAC and that the fail-
ure of the Forest Service to consider this impact when it dropped its
PAC amounted to an "insufficient consideration of cumulative im-
pact under NEPA."127
b. Likelihood of Success with NFMA Claims
i. Tree Diameter
Earth Island claimed the Forest Service violated NFMA when it
decided to permit logging of trees over twenty inches in diameter,
and drop PAC055 and PAC075 without later readjusting the bound-
aries of these PACs.1 28 Earth Island argued that the twenty-inch
limitation should apply only to areas with mild to moderate burn
levels, despite the explanation by the Forest Service that the limita-
tion applied to undergrowth thinning and not salvage logging after
a fire. 129 The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, asserting that noth-
126. See id. at 1306-07 (arguing spotted owls depend on HRCAs surrounding
PACs and, thus, destruction of HRCA in Eldorado National Forest may impact
those owls inhabiting PAC075 within Tahoe forest boundaries). Furthermore, the
Final EIS only mentioned cumulative impacts on two occasions and both times the
Final EIS assumed Tahoe PAC075 would also be removed due to unsuitable stan-
dards. See id. at 1307. Yet, due to the discovery of the owl pair, Tahoe National
Forest decided not to de-list its PAC075. See id.
127. See id. at 1307 (explaining because Sierra Nevada Framework permits de-
listing of owl PAC only when area is deemed unsuitable due to catastrophic stand-
replacing event and surveys confirm non-occupancy, and because Forest Service, in
its own survey, discovered presence of owl pair, it could have been reasonably fore-
seen that Tahoe would not de-list PAC075). See id. at 1310-15 (Clifton, J., dissent-
ing). Of the majority's major arguments, the dissent took issue with two of them.
See id. The dissent argued that the district court applied the correct standard when
assessing irreparable injury, despite using "slightly different words" in its assess-
ment. See id. at 1311 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (clarifying that language used by dis-
trict court was "intended to emphasize that Plaintiffs did not persuade it that the
chance or probability of actual harm-as opposed to something speculative-was
sufficient to tip the balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary injunc-
tion"). In addition, the dissent disagreed that the Forest Service should have rea-
sonably foreseen that Tahoe would not de-list its PAC075, because one agency can
not predict the actions of another. See id. at 1314-15 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (re-
jecting majority's argument that because forests share border, cumulative impact
of reasonably foreseeable actions should have been considered and submitting
that argument is not actually about Tahoe's de-listing of PAC075, but instead is
criticism of Eldorado's de-listing of its PAC075 because of discovery of owl pair).
128. See id. at 1302 (arguing three separate Forest Service decisions violate
NFMA). For a discussion of NFMA, see supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
129. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1302 (explaining that although Star Fire Plan
allows some logging of larger trees, it does not establish violation of Framework).
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ing in the Framework indicated the diameter limitation must be
maintained in specific areas of the forest. 130
ii. Maintenance of PAC055 and PAC075
Additionally, Earth Island argued that the Forest Service failed
to maintain PAC055 and PAC075.' 31 The Framework agreement
requires PAC maintenance despite occupancy status of the Califor-
nia spotted owl, unless the area becomes uninhabitable as the result
of a "catastrophic stand-replacing event" and surveys confirm the
spotted owl's non-occupancy. 132 To demonstrate probability of suc-
cess on this claim, Earth Island had to show that the Forest Service
failed to meet both requirements. 3 3 The Ninth Circuit found that
although the Forest Service provided a plausible explanation for
characterizing the Star Fire as a catastrophic stand-replacing event,
Earth Island raised a legitimate concern about whether the agency
could meet the second requirement.134 The Forest Service coun-
tered that surveys were unnecessary following such intense fire de-
struction because the prospect of owl population occupancy in such
an area is extremely low as a result of the fire. 135 Yet, the Ninth
Circuit pointed out that the surveys are intended to determine this
very fact; the Forest Service's treatment of the surveys as unneces-
sary allowed the Forest Service to de-list the PAC while ignoring
contrary information about owl occupancy, namely that an owl pair
had been found.13 6 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the For-
est Service did not comply with the Framework agreement and,
thus, violated NFMA. 13 7
130. See id. at 1302-03 (concluding that limitation need not be maintained
under Sierra Nevada Framework when twenty-inch limitation had been lifted in
some portions of same area of forest and Forest Service has composed comprehen-
sive plan for entire area).
131. See id. at 1303 (arguing that Forest Service violated Framework
agreement).
132. See id. (holding that both criteria must be met in order to succeed on
merits of claim).
133. See id. (setting out test for PAC claims).
134. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1303 (explaining Forest Service relied heavily
on its evidence of dead or dying trees in area to justify why habitat was unsuitable
for spotted owl, but that surveys did not confirm non-occupancy of owl population;
rather, results discovered owl pair).
135. See id. at 1303-04 (directing court to information from its website, Forest
Service explained of high likelihood that owls will simply relocate).
136. See id. (adding further that because Forest Service found some remaining
green within disputed PACs, need for surveys was warranted in any case).
137. See id. at 1304 (explaining Forest Service's decision can be invalidated if
"the scheme is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the forest plan") (citing Forest
Guardians v. United States Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Improper Legal Standard of Irreparable Injury
The Ninth Circuit was correct to conclude that the district
court applied an improper legal standard in denying injunction
when it found that Earth Island "failed to establish that the project
will result in actual harm to the California spotted owl" and "failed
to identify any concrete probability of irreparable harm in any other
respect."1 38 In granting preliminary injunctive relief, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied upon alternative criteria rather than the traditional crite-
ria. 139 Under the alternative criteria, Earth Island needed to show a
combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury, as Johnson established. 140 The higher standard
relied on by the district court substantially increased Earth Island's
burden in proving the "possibility of irreparable injury."141 The
proper standard for preliminary injunctive relief, regardless of
whether the traditional or alternative criteria apply, only requires a
showing of probable success on the merits and a possibility of irrepara-
ble injury. 142
Moreover, in an effort to protect the environment, courts have
consistently found that Forest Service logging plans alone can fulfill
the irreparable injury requirement. 143 In fact, the Amoco court con-
templated this very type of injury when it declared "[e]nviron-
mental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by
money damages and is often permanent or at least of long dura-
tion, i.e., irreparable."1 44 Additionally, the Rules establish that a
138. See id. at 1310-11 (Clifton,J., dissenting) (contending district court prop-
erly set forth both sets of criteria for preliminary injunctive relief and that discrep-
ancy amounted to semantic argument). See id. For a discussion of the dissent's
main arguments, see supra note 127.
139. For a discussion of criteria for preliminary injunctive relief, see supra
notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
140. See Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.
1995) (describing alternative set of criteria for preliminary injunctive relief).
141. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1298 (explaining that district court's inter-
pretation of standard placed higher burden on Earth Island than was required for
grant of preliminary injunction).
142. For a discussion of criteria for preliminary injunctive relief, see supra
notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
143. See Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding impending and ongoing logging activities presented "evidence of
environmental harm... sufficient to tip the balance in favor of injunctive relief');
see also Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1382
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding "[t] he old growth forests plaintiffs seek to protect would,
if cut, take hundreds of years to reproduce").
144. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1299 (citing Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545) (promot-
ing policy that environment demands more protection).
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preliminary injunction should be issued when threat of injury is
likely, 145 The district court failed to consider the deference af-
forded to environmental protection when it applied a stricter stan-
dard for irreparable injury. 146  Thus, the Ninth Circuit
appropriately concluded that the district court applied an improper
legal standard in its assessment of irreparable injury. 147
B. Success on the Merits
1. Comprehensive EIS: Similar Actions?
The Ninth Circuit failed to follow its own precedent when it
held that the Star Fire restoration projects and timber sales in both
the Eldorado and Tahoe National Forests need not be considered
in a single EIS, despite the Ninth Circuit's own finding that they
were "similar actions."148 In Northwest, the Ninth Circuit held "an
agency is required to consider more than one action in a single EIS
if they are 'connected actions,' 'cumulative actions' or 'similar ac-
tions.' "1 49 The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this decision in Native Eco-
systems when it asserted that "connected, cumulative and similar
actions must be considered together. '1 50
In its holding in Earth Island, the Ninth Circuit decided the
requirements for "similar actions" were not as rigorous as those for
"connected" or "cumulative actions."'15' The Ninth Circuit com-
pared the language in the Regulations for "connected" and "cumu-
145. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 55 (noting threat of injury is adequate
for grant of preliminary injunction).
146. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1299 (noting Circuit Court has often held
commercial logging plans may satisfy irreparable injury criterion because of their
long term environmental consequences); see also supra note 54 and accompanying
text.
147. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1298 (holding "actual harm" and "concrete
probability" both place higher burden on Earth Island than "possibility" of injury).
148. See id. at 1306 (holding Forest Service may have reasonably concluded
two separate impact statements constituted best way to assess effect of "similar
actions").
149. See Northwest Res. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060,
1064 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on interpretation of Code of Federal Regulations in
its finding); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.25 (defining "connected," "cumulative" and
"similar actions"). Section 1508.25 states that a single EIS is required for similar
actions when "the best way to assess adequately the combined impacts of similar
actions . . . is to treat them in a single impact statement." 40 C.F.R. pt.
1508.25(a)(3). For a discussion of "connected," "cumulative" and "similar ac-
tions," see supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
150. See Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 2002)
(making similar argument as did Earth Island that "similar actions" must be con-
sidered in single EIS).
151. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1306 (suggesting Regulations imply agency
has more deference for "similar actions").
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lative actions" with the language concerning "similar actions;" the
former states that they both should be considered in a single EIS,
while the latter states only that an agency may wish to consider "simi-
lar actions" in a single EIS.152 The court therefore decided "similar
actions" need not be assessed in a comprehensive EIS. 153 With this
sudden change of conviction, the Ninth Circuit reinforced its deci-
sion by asserting that because neither Northwest nor Native Ecosystems
actually involved a specific claim about "similar actions," it had
been unnecessary for the court to analyze the specific language in
the Regulations governing "similar actions."154 Consequently, in
the immediate case, the Ninth Circuit felt justified holding that
"similar actions" were not required to be considered in a single EIS
after actually analyzing the plain language in the Regulations, de-
spite holding otherwise in previous cases. 155
The Ninth Circuit further bolstered this holding by relying on
the informed discretion of the agency.1 56 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit did not explore whether it would be better to consider the
conceded "similar actions" in a single EIS; rather, the court simply
advanced that the agency knew best because of the technical analy-
sis and expertise necessary to make this type of decision and, there-
fore, the agency's decision was reasonable. 157 The court appeared
to shirk its responsibility by deferring to the discretion of the
agency rather than confronting its own precedent concerning "sim-
ilar actions," especially because the court confirmed that "the many
similarities in underlying cause, proposed solution, and general ge-
ography place the post-fire sales in the Tahoe and Eldorado Na-
tional Forests into this category [of 'similar actions']." 158
152. See id. (noting semantic differences).
153. See id. (comparing different sections of Regulations regarding "connec-
ted actions," "cumulative actions" and "similar actions").
154. See id. (emphasizing "[n] either case actually involved a claim about 'simi-
lar actions,' nor did either decision analyze that particular regulatory provision").
155. See id. (finding specific language governing "similar actions" afforded
more discretion than for "connected" or "cumulative actions").
156. For a discussion of the rationale behind court's conclusion, see supra
note 108.
157. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1306 (determining that after contrasting "the
clear language of the [R]egulations with the isolated sentence contained in two
cases that do not discuss 'similar' actions," court was compelled to conclude that
agency did not act arbitrarily).
158. See id. at 1305-06 (finding post-fire sales in both forests are "similar
actions").
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2. Foreseeable Actions in Tahoe National Forest
The majority concluded that both the Forest Service and the
district court failed to anticipate an element of the Tahoe National
Forest Plan and, therefore, did not consider the cumulative impact
of foreseeable actions. 159 Because the two parks share a border, the
Ninth Circuit asserted that it was reasonable for the Forest Service
to consider the potential impact of Tahoe's restoration plan on El-
dorado.1 60 Section 1508.7 of the Regulations requires analysis of
cumulative impacts of proposed actions together with reasonably
foreseeable future actions.161 Accordingly, the Eldorado Forest Ser-
vice had a responsibility to investigate the incremental impacts of
Tahoe's Forest Plan on its own, especially upon the discovery of an
owl pair in the adjoining PACs between the two parks. 162 Contrary
to the dissent, the majority correctly followed the established princi-
ple that for past, present and reasonably foreseeable actions, the
Forest Service is obligated to assess their cumulative impacts.1 63
The Ninth Circuit discussed this principle in Native Ecosystems.164 In
that case, although the Forest Service addressed cumulative impact
in its Final EIS, it did not specifically address the cumulative impact
of the road density amendments and, therefore, did not give "ade-
quate consideration of cumulative effects.' '1 65
Here, the Forest Service assumed the Tahoe National Forest
had removed its PAC075, despite the discovery of an owl pair. 166
Consequently, the Forest Service only considered the cumulative
impact of the removal of its PAC075 in conjunction with Tahoe's
159. See id. at 1306 (clarifying cumulative impact involves "incremental impact
of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
actions, regardless of what agency.., or person undertakes such other actions")
(quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.7).
160. See id. at 1314 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that actions con-
cerning Tahoe plan were "assumed" based on preliminary plan, with no further
inquisition).
161. For a discussion of "cumulative impacts," see supra note 125 and accom-
panying text.
162. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1307 (restating majority's argument).
163. See id. at 1314 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's conclusion
that Forest Service should have foreseen Tahoe "would not-indeed could not-
de-list PAC075").
164. See Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
"NEPA always requires that an environmental analysis for a single project consider
cumulative impacts of that project together with 'past, present and reasonably fore-
seeable future actions.'" Id.
165. See id. at 896 (describing need for cumulative impacts to be addressed
fully in environmental assessments to determine whether EIS trigger is prompted).
166. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1307 (criticizing Forest Service for its assump-
tion that Tahoe PAC075 had been dropped).
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removal of Tahoe's PAC075, and failed to consider the cumulative
impact of the removal of its PAC075 in conjunction with Tahoe's
possible preservation of Tahoe's PAC075. 167 The Forest Service did
not address the cumulative impacts together with all possible com-
binations of foreseeable actions, thereby violating the requirement
that the Forest Service give "adequate consideration of cumulative
impacts." 168 As a result, the Ninth Circuit suitably held that the For-
est Service's Final EIS insufficiently considered the cumulative im-
pacts of Tahoe's Forest Plan.1 69
VI. IMPACT
The policy underlying NEPA was furthered as a result of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Earth Island because the holding "pro-
mote [d] efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the envi-
ronment" and, in ruling, the Ninth Circuit also protected the policy
advanced under NEPA to do "whatever possible to protect the envi-
ronment."170 By upholding that policy and granting preliminary in-
junctive relief, the Ninth Circuit maintained that the environment
necessitates great protection. 71
The Ninth Circuit's finding that "similar actions" need not be
considered in a single EIS, however, may have a profound effect on
future litigation.172 Case law previously established that "similar ac-
tions," like "connected" and "cumulative actions," should be consid-
ered in one comprehensive EIS.1 73 Here, because the court
distinguished "similar actions" from "connected" and "cumulative
actions," this decision may afford future "similar actions" to pro-
ceed with less delay, and may also result in greater detriment to the
167. See id. at 1308 n.12 (noting worst case scenario was to assume Tahoe
would not de-list its PAC despite Forest Service's argument that worst case scenario
was to assume Tahoe PAC would also be de-listed).
168. See id. at 1308 (stating court's holding that Final EIS did not sufficiently
consider cumulative impacts of Star Fire sale).
169. See id. (explaining agency could have reasonably anticipated that Tahoe
forest would be required to maintain its PAC).
170. For a discussion about NEPA policy, see supra notes 61-62 and accompa-
nying text.
171. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1308 (holding Earth Island demonstrated
reasonable probability of success on merits of certain claims, and district court
applied improper legal standard of irreparable injury).
172. For a discussion of the court's holding that "similar actions" need not be
considered in a single EIS, see supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion concerning the requirement of a single EIS, see supra
notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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environment. 174 By permitting EIS reports to have a narrower
scope, potential damage to the environment may go unrealized un-
til after several "similar actions" have commenced and the injury
already sustained. 175
In addition, the Earth Island decision came about as President
George W. Bush signed HFRA into law. 176 Though HFRA seeks to
protect our national forests, environmental groups have charged
that it intends to do the exact opposite of what its name implies by
enabling significant increases in commercial logging. 177 Propo-
nents of HFRA argue, however, that logging has decreased under
the Bush Administration as compared to the final years of the Clin-
ton Administration-an Administration viewed as environmentally-
friendly.1 78 Yet, in 2004, the Bush Administration sold twenty-four
percent more national forest timber than did the Clinton Adminis-
tration in its last year, so more will be accessible for logging in forth-
coming years. 179 Furthermore, because HFRA's purpose is to
streamline measures, it may, in effect, pressure courts to handle le-
gal challenges to logging proposals on an expedited basis which,
critics contend, increases the potential for irreparable injury to the
environment.180
Nevertheless, by overturning the district court's denial of a pre-
liminary injunction, the Earth Island court expressed its preference
to act with caution when handling controversies surrounding the
fragile environment.181 Despite attempts to protect and restore na-
tional forests in courts and through legislation, there still exists a
174. See Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1304-05 (explaining single EIS is required for
individual projects when projects are "connected," "cumulative" or "similar ac-
tions" in order to prevent agency from segmenting larger projects into multiple
projects with comparatively insignificant environmental impacts, but which collec-
tively have substantial impacts).
175. See id. (describing risk of analyzing "connected," "cumulative" or "similar
actions" in separate EIS reports).
176. For a discussion about the timing of HFRA, see supra note 90 and accom-
panying text.
177. For a discussion of environmental groups' arguments, see supra notes 93-
96 and accompanying text.
178. See Milstein, supra note 97 (rebutting accusations that Bush Administra-
tion has pillaged national forests).
179. See id. (observing environmental groups may be justified when they "vilify
George W. Bush").
180. For a discussion about the objectives of HFRA, see supra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text.
181. See Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1299 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding Supreme Court has also recognized that "[e]nvironmental in-
jury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is
often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is
sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of
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healthy tension between the Forest Service and environmental
groups over how best to manage our forest lands ensuring a flood
of litigation for years to come.18 2
Kimberly P. Verruso
an injunction to protect the environment") (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of
Gambel; 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)).
182. For a discussion about ongoing tension between environmental groups
and Forest Service, see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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